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Summary 
The EU concepts of modernizing public procurement focus on using it as a means. One of the most 
important aims in the EU regulation of public procurement is to prioritize SMEs, though the practical 
implementation of this is seldom delineated. On the basis of the Hungarian example, our article gives a 
detailed account of the results of a single policy at national level. We analyze how a Member State is able to 
utilize public procurement activity, and the conditions of shaping public procurement rules to meet 
requirements. As per our conclusion, for cultural and historical reasons, this EU Member State with little 
public procurement past has regarded public procurement as a parade ground, misunderstanding the real 
meaning of public procurement and making legislative mistake after mistake, forgetful of the efficient 
spending of public funds. Modernizing public procurement has thus had mixed results. 
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1. Introduction 
Public procurement can be used for many sensible goals. Following the lead of European 
Union SME-focused and Social Aspects trends, Member States have devised their the specific 
policies, models, solutions . Based on the Hungarian case,  our paper hopes to show how ideas 
set free by their inventors can be misunderstood or more exactly misused.  
The relevance of the issue was demonstrated by Morand’s discussion of SMEs and public 
procurement policy (Morand (2003)). He characterizes an optimal procurement policy as a 
“mechanism design problem when allotment of the contract is available, i.e., when a 
government faces both SMEs and large firms for carrying out a heterogeneously divisible 
project”.3 Morand points out that the European “Community approach tends to rely on 
improving access for SMEs only through a non-discriminatory approach. With no preferential 
rules, SMEs compete on an equal footing with larger firms. Nevertheless, there are other 
different practical possibilities.”4  
But why should public procurement be regarded as a means and why should it be made a 
parade ground? Beside focussing on purchasing criteria, our answer points to Directive 
definitions, which tend to push cost-effective spending of public money completely into the 
background. It is not an accident that the first results of the EU Green Book point to the 
growing popularity of negotiated procedures and to more user-friendly solutions, especially 
concerning public utilities. European Public Procurement is abandoning its original goal and 
among its manifold targets cost-effective spending of public money has ceased to be the most 
important priority.  
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Our investigation focuses on two main topics: prioritization of SMEs and that public 
procurement has also become an economic crisis managing tool in recent years . As a result, 
Hungary – also encouraged by the public procurement approach of the EU focusing on 
particular means – wishes to comply with the spirit of our time by suspending purchasing in 
general and slowing down the procurement procedures. 
2. The role of public procurement in Hungary 
Public procurement currently amounts to over 5 percent of the GDP, which is a drop from 
7 percent in recent years. The government uses public procurement as a means to combat 
illegal employment, to protect SMEs as well as to improve compliance with invoicing 
deadlines or to increase employment rates.  
Prior to the crises, apart from modifying remedy rules under modified EU Directives, 
there was a clear intention to simplify public procurement rules, to reduce the number of 
multi-level national regimes and to make the law more transparent. As a result of fighting 
corruption, strict rules were introduced further narrowing the freedom of the parties in an 
overregulated environment. 
Most of the debates are generated by the problems stemming from the different ways of 
using EU subsidies since the high national rate of applying for remedies and the sophisticated 
system of regulations make it risky for the winners of EU-funded contracts to implement 
projects.  
Since it is easy to make mistakes  tendering procedures, there is a growing demand for a 
more transparent system and streamlined administration, especially in an environment lacking 
capital .  
The Corvinus University of Budapest conducted several surveys asking public 
procurement experts and legislators about their opinion and feelings concerning e.g. ethical 
problems, efficiency, transparency, overregulation, and competition in the public procurement 
market. Conducted in a 4-year-period, our researches involved several questionnaires (Tátrai 
(2006)), and this study is based on the most recent and most developed one, completed in 
2009. In the questionnaire, we used closed-ended questions and the respondents had to 
perform SWOT analyses so as their personal references could be established. The number of 
respondents (on average, more than 120) and the quality of their answers show that public 
procurement experts understood the aim of the research and could focus on the real problems 
and opportunities of public procurement. Respondents mainly included experts, regulators, 
bidders, representatives of contracting authorities, and members of public procurement 
organisations. So the sample cannot be regarded as a representative one.  
The 2009 research at Budapest Corvinus University on the “Morality and efficiency in 
public procurement”5 featured several questions directly regarding the relation between public 
procurement and competition. When asked if public procurement helps competition or hinders 
it, ¾ of the respondents judged public procurement as not really helping competition. 
Compared to 2007 data, recent statistical data show a grimmer picture about the ability of 
public procurement to deter unfair competition. According to most respondents, these 
expectations are badly or not sufficiently satisfied by public procurement regulations. Trying 
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to combat the negative effects of the recession, the government optimistically intended to use 
public procurement as a means without making any serious efforts to improve its efficiency.  
3. The role of SMEs
6
 in Hungary  
Notions of modernisation via public procurement aim to bring SMEs on to the playing 
field of public procurement. ‘Patriotic public procurement’, i.e. giving an advantage to local 
enterprises, is an important aim in Hungary, too, yet the EU Directives applicable allow for 
only a limited opportunity to put this into practice. Instead of openly supporting national 
arrangements, the support of SMEs dominates with the aim of bringing local enterprises on to 
the playing field. In our case study, we seek to present the conditions and opportunities of 
SMEs on the public-procurement market, with a brief digression on the purchase of local 
products.  Since 2004, public procurement rules have continued to be modified in Hungary 
aiming to fulfil aims which thrust the day-to-day concerns of SMEs into the background. The 
recent upsurge of interest in SMEs has not necessarily levelled off the other aims; it has rather 
called attention to the fact that contradictory objectives rule out success. 
In the Hungarian economy, SMEs play a particularly significant role. Their conditions of 
operation and competitiveness influence the overall performance of the economy, and 
determine employment. As a result of the changes in the 1990s, the number of SMEs has 
continually increased. The sector accounts for 99,9% of domestic enterprises, produces half of 
the GDP, and employs 71.7% of the work force(2.5 million persons).Two-thirds of the SMEs 
involve self-employment and one-third partnerships.  
SMEs represent 99.9% of all operating enterprises in Hungary. The proportion of 
microenterprises, involving self-employment or 1-9 employees, is high (94.2%), while 
medium-sized enterprises have a markedly low rate by international comparison. The average 
size of Hungarian SMEs (4 persons) is small in comparison with old EU Member States. Big 
companies employ 28.3% of the work force. 
In 2008, SMEs employed 71.7% of the labour force in the private economy, accounted for 
55.4% of added value, produced 61.3% of the net return from sales, and had a 27.8% share of 
exports. SMEs have a prominent role in employment. However, the great number of ‘forced’ 
enterprises means that SME employment is much more unstable than in big companies. 
The average Hungarian SME is thus smaller at least in respect of the number of 
employees than in other EU Member States, employing on average one person less than their 
EU counterparts (3.3 vs. 4.3). The public-procurement conditions of Hungarian SMEs are 
quite advantageous, the total value of public-procurement contracts awarded to SMEs being 
50% higher than the EU average (56% vs. 38%). Payment delays by public offices are 
somewhat less than EU average, the former being 20 days, the latter 25. Data on the more 
concrete category of ‘expounding and simplifying regulations and systems’ place Hungary 
behind EU average, as well.
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4. Interpreting SME support 
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One of the major priorities of the modernization of public procurement is bringing SMEs 
into on to the playing field. But the details of how to do so are rarely mentioned . „Patriotic 
public procurement”, i.e. preferring domestic enterprises, is an important aim in Hungary, as 
well, but the EU Directives have little room for it. Instead of openly supporting patriotic or 
national arrangements, propping up SMEs  dominates, which is more likely to give an 
advantage to local enterprises.  
The Hungarian Public Procurement rules have been constantly changing since 2004, with 
aims often running against the everyday problems of SMEs. The favourable treatment of the 
SMEs is not exclusive, since the legislation of recent years has been dominated by reducing 
public dues, fighting against illegal employment, reducing debt cycles and solving the crises 
as the main goals through public procurement. In certain cases, the different goals undo each 
other; for example, when, in a procurement procedure, there was only one valid bidder left at 
the end, the contracting authority was obliged to declare the whole procedure invalid
8
. This 
might have been a solution for SMEs, since often less experienced and smaller SMEs were 
subjected to this kind of unlawful invalidation process. But, as a result, the number of invalid 
procedures has increased, and with this the transaction costs have grown as well, making 
public procurement more expensive.  
One of the most interesting examples was the initiative according to which the bidder 
itself would have been obliged to complete at least 50% of its undertaking in the 
implementation period of the contract. Originally this was intended as a SME-friendly 
arrangement, since it limited the over 10% involvement of sub-contractors. But the legislator 
obvious had not realized that this rule automatically excluded smaller contractors from the 
competition, and jeopardized purchasing services such as taxi or tourist agency. Since the 
flawed modification of the definition of sub-contractor made participants in a project be 
deemed as sub-contractors. As a result, companies using taxi services or organizing plane 
ticket and hotel bookings were not able to make an offer, because they were not allowed to 
directly perform 50%, and involve any airline involve as joint bidder. So this rule was 
unreasonable and was revoked on 1 October 2009.  
Another good example for different rules running counter to each other was the 
application of § 36/A of Act of XCII of 2003 on Taxation, according to which contracting 
authorities were prohibited from paying contractors and sub-contractors with public dues. 
Although this can reduce public dues , but at the same time will increases cycle debts, which  
§ 305 currently in force tries to address this  by directly defining payments to contractors. 
Nevertheless, these parallel rules cannot result in significant success, they can only achieve 
moderate results. This means, for example, that the over-regulation of payments results in a 
growing tendency among contractors to hide their sub-contractors, which is the exact opposite 
of the preferred result, namely, that the payments to sub-contractors should be made 
transparently and controllably. So, despite the more entitlements of parties to examine 
documents and initiate remedy procedures, the too strict and over-regulated rules result in 
creative, often unlawful responses by those concerned. On the basis of the above, supporting 
SMEs cannot be interpreted in itself; in each case, the indirect consequences of allowing the 
incorporation of a new idea into the public procurement system should be established. 
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It is a false approach that the SMEs can be treated as a unified group. Many of them are 
very experienced, and have achieved major results in Hungary, but we have too little 
information about the conditions of Hungarian SMEs in general, so we have only indirect 
knowledge about their particular problems and needs in the public procurement market. In 
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what follows, we wish provide an overview based on the data available of how far Hungarian 
SMEs face difficulties and are encumbered in public procurement. 
10
 
About Hungarian SMEs, we can safely say that their support is reasonable, but they are 
not subjected to serious disadvantages according to our figures below. There is a difference 
between the volume based on the number of public procurement procedures and the volume 
based on the value of public procurements. Almost 80% of public procurement procedures are 
won by SMEs, but the value of these public procurements is only 47.81%.  
 
Source: Public Procurement Council, preliminary data 2011.  
Table 2. The share of the SMEs based on number of public procurement procedures in 2011 
Looking at the available data, we will not seek to provide an overview of the referential 
system within which we have to develop our own solutions for supporting smaller enterprises. 
6. The European Idea 
The most comprehensive reports on the SMEs were prepared in 2004
11
 and then in 2007
12
 
in the European Union. These intended to emphasize the opportunities of SMEs in public 
procurement procedures. In order to increase the role of SMEs, these reports focused on the 
basic opportunities provided by information technology (e-mail, Internet), emphasized the 
importance of easy access to documentation and general information, the application of 
technical-professional and financial-economic eligibility criteria, allowing partial offers, the 
short offer deadlines, the cost of the offers, the too strict administrative limitations, the vague 
language, and the lack of basic information about the public procurement rules.
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The Code of Best Practices
14
 listed solutions to the main difficulties en countered and 
reported by SMEs:  
 Overcoming difficulties relating to the size of contracts  
 Ensuring access to relevant information  
 Improving the quality and understanding of the information provided  
 Setting proportionate qualification levels and financial requirements  
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 Alleviating administrative burden  
 Placing emphasis on value for money rather than on price  
 Giving sufficient time to draw up tenders  
 Ensuring that Ensuring that payments are made on time    
From this list we do not receive direct answers about what and how to introduce in our 
own market, but we can identify some steps to be taken in order to increase the role of 
Hungarian SMEs, which can help adapt the general guidelines to the Hungarian environment. 
In the following, we wish to provide an overview of the present opportunities and limitations. 
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7. What we have achieved so far  
After joining the EU the role of the SMEs was not emphasized in public procurement, the 
tendency changing only in 2009-10. Some additional goals, such as reducing cycle debts were 
pursued in parallel with the support of the SMEs, with more or less considered elements in the 
regulations. In other words, the making of Hungarian model is currently in progress, the ways 
of supporting SMEs and bringing them into the playing field are being sought for. 
In what follows we would like to analyze those changes that will affect the SMEs in the 
public procurement market due to the new regulations come into force in 2012, especially 
looking at the direction and character of the changes.  
1. Unequivocal Preference and Suport: Some elements of the regulations currently in 
force allow the preference of the local, smaller enterprises. For example, under the national 
regime,
16 
tenderers not reaching a revenue of HUF 1 billion net of VAT can be preferred by 
the contracting authorities. But this solution is  rarely applied by contracting authorities, 
especially as the Intermediate Body does not support such in the case of EU funding . So this 
direct approach, such as the former 10% option, does not live up to the expectations. The new 
regulation carries on the former practice under the national regime.  
2. The Question of Language: This is one of the most effective, indirect solutions to 
support domestic tenderers. Following European custom, we tried to obstruct foreign bids by 
way of our language; as of 1 April 2009, tenders have to be compiled in Hungarian 
irrespective of the fact that no Hungarian tenders can be expected, i.e. there is no point in 
compiling it in Hungarian. This rule in the name of protectionism is a solution which indicates 
that the legislator wished to prioritize SMEs indirectly by closing in, rather than widening the 
competition. The 2012 amendment refines this former approach stating that the official 
language of the public procurement procedure is Hungarian, but the contracting authorities 
can allow the use of other languages instead of Hungarian in the procedure, but cannot make 
this mandatory.  
3. Regulations Revoked There is definite progress, though, because the institution of 
security funds, the strange rule of mandatory invalidation
17,
 the mandatory control of  
announcements, and the mandatory use of a particular electronic programme for preparing the 
detailed budget have been revoked. It can easily be seen that revoking these regulations, 
which increased the cost and administration of the procedures and made abuse possible, 
significantly improved the positions of SMEs.  
4. Partial Offers: A new element introduced in 2010 in order to promote the participation 
of the SMEs in public procurement made it mandatory for contracting authorities to allow 
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partial offers if the type of the of the object of the procurement and other considerations make 
it feasible. As Morand pointed out: “the very first way of enabling direct SME participation in 
Public procurement to divide proposed acquisitions of suppliers and services into reasonably 
small lots to permit offers on quantities less than the total requirement. But the consequence is 
that this allotment favours wide small business participation. But it also leads to competition 
between small and larger firms”18.  
5. Making it Simple: The regulations of the national regime will have been simplified 
significantly by 2012. The intention of the legislator regarding procurements below the Union 
threshold was to make public procurement procedures more accessible for the small 
enterprises operating among local conditions, to make the procedures simpler, so that bidders 
can make offers for projects with less value without the help of special public procurement 
experts. Under the national regime, the contracting authorities can use their own procedures if 
they purchase goods or services, which makes the procedures much more flexible and 
advantageous for themselves.  
This is a significant simplification, since the contracting authorities creating their own 
procedural regulations can significantly reduce the number of declarations and certificates 
necessary for the procedure, and can shorten the deadlines making the whole procedure 
shorter. There are some doubts concerning the remedy procedures, because the remedy forum 
has to familiarize itself in each case with a new procedure, which will increase the amount of 
time and energy spent on the procedure, and will make the results less predictable.  
6. Making Payments: The new Act revokes the regulations concerning the payments to 
sub-contractors, which caused a lot of practical problems, and it maximizes the payment 
deadline in 60 days, where the 30-day prolongation can only be applied for good reasons. The 
goal is to avoid a situation where smaller enterprises are forced to accept extremely long 
payment deadlines which are significant burden for them.  
There is an interesting innovation that will probably improve the chances and performance 
abilities of not only the small and micro-enterprises; in the case of construction projects and 
projects reaching the Union threshold, the bidder will be entitled to an advance payment.
19
 
This advance is to help small enterprises in commencing the project. The amount of the 
advance payment is maximized in HUF 10 million in order to assist specifically those small 
and micro-enterprises that do not have the necessary finances to start a project.  
7. SME as a Solid Bidder: The new regulation widens the scope for negotiated procedures 
without a notice: if the invitation to tender is directly sent to at least three tenderers, this 
procedure will be regarded as a negotiated procedure without notice instead of the former 
simple procedure with three offers. In the case of construction projects, the upper limit of 
applicability is set to 150 million HUF by the new regulations as far as  the procedure 
involves dispatching three invitations to tender. In this case, there is no need to notify the 
Public Procurement Arbitration Board about the commencing of the procedure, and the policy 
goal of the Act is reinforced by the fact that it specifically states that the invitation to tender 
should be sent only to SMEs.  
8. The Price of the Documentation: In Hungary, under the practice of the remedy forum, 
the cost of the preparation of the tender documentation can be included in the price by the 
contracting authorities
20
. The price of such documentation is often excessively high, yet 
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understandable if it required extensive preparation. According to the current and the new 
regulations coming into force next year, the documentation price should be based on the costs 
incurred during preparation and in making it available to the tenderers during the public 
procurement procedure. So there is no change in the new regulations concerning the 
limitations of the price of the documentation.  
9. Sub-Contractors, Entities Providing Resources, Experts: The considerable amount of 
problems caused by the non-clear distinction between sub-contractors and entities providing 
resources will be partially eliminated, because the controversial notion of entity providing 
resources will not be used any more. The new regulation states that the tenderers can meet the 
eligibility requirements by using the capacity of other institutions, regardless of the nature of 
the legal connection between them, which is certainly a SME-friendly solution. The new Act, 
has  no special regulations concerning sub-contractors employed in a value that is over 10% 
of the project value . I t also cancels the provision that sub-contractors employed in a value 
over 10% of the project value are obliged – just like the tenderers – to present certificates 
regarding the reasons for exclusion. According to the new regulation, it will be sufficient to 
present a declaration in which the tenderer declares that it will not employ sub-contractors 
who are subject to the reasons for exclusion. So there will be fewer certificates needed 
concerning sub-contractors, which surely favours the smaller ones. Apart from the fact that 
only the tenderer is obliged to declare that it will not employ sub-contractors who are subject 
to reasons for exclusion, any eligibility requirements concerning the sub-contractors themselves 
cannot be prescribed either. 
10. Prohibition of Multiple Participation: The new regulation clearly defines options of 
competence confirmation of tenderers (participants) and sub-contractors. This is important for 
smaller enterprises because, according to the new PPA the same sub-contractor can participate 
in more than one tender, which enhances its chances for winning.
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12. Threshold of Public Procurement: National thresholds are defined in the annual 
budget. The thresholds have been unchanged for three years in Hungary, and applying the rule 
of aggregation mentioned above obliges the contracting authorities to initiate costly public 
procurement procedures at a very low minimal threshold.  
The threshold of public procurement should be increased and it should be synchronized 
with the rule of aggregation in order to create a real-life situation, where there is a need for 
public procurement only if its value and costs make it reasonable.  
13. Cheaper Bidding, Formal Requirements: The deficiencies of the rules of the simple 
procedure point to the fact that it is unnecessary to ask for declarations and document copies 
signed by a notary public. In order to make bidding as cheap as possible, only minimal formal 
requirements should be posed to the bidders, and only the winner should be obliged to present 
confirmations of reasons of exclusion. The regulation of this area has been clearly solved by 
the legislator by advising the contracting authorities not to ask for a certified translation or a 
certified copy if they do not really need it
.22 
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5. Control, Centralisation, Crisis 
Using public procurement as a stimulating tool helps SMEs take a more decisive role and 
is intended to increase employment, but it simultaneously has other goals, as well. In 2011 the 
government was forced to slow down public procurements, then stop them completely. This 
general standstill means that it is not only purchasing that is suspended, but also that the 
Ministry of National Development directly controls each and every purchasing of the central 
public institutions financed by the state. As a result, the already ongoing procurement 
processes are delayed by several months. So the government tries to save money through 
public procurement by simply postponing or completely suspending purchasing. Beside 
reviewing existing contracts and prohibiting signing new ones, the permitted procurement 
processes are also controlled.  
The government, apart from exercising strict central control, intends in its new decree to 
centralize the purchasing of the economic institutions owned by the government. New 
government decrees emerge that seek to promote employment and provide direct public 
procurement contracts to SMEs, and in the mean time the purchasing of the smaller local 
governments is also being centralized.  
Beside centralization and assisting the smaller enterprises, there are also regulations that 
hinder the normal operation of the public procurement market and reduce its competitiveness. 
Carayannis E.G, Popescu D. (2005) state, regarding the connection between procurement and 
competitiveness especially in the Central and Eastern European countries, that the 
introduction of new Internet technologies will make public procurement much more 
transparent and efficient. The competition in the public procurement market will be more 
directly stimulated this way, information will be available in a wider circle and this will lead 
to the further reduction of competition limits. The authors question the idea that electronic 
procurement and especially public procurement are good policy means for creating a basis for 
an efficient market economy, and that this in itself would directly increase the economic 
performance of the country, eliminate all the obstacles hindering cross-border co-operation, 
and automatically increase efficiency. Their analysis focuses on the efforts of the European 
Union to make public procurement processes more cost-effective and innovative. The goal is 
to demonstrate that information technology can be the right tool to assist structural reforms in 
the countries concerned, and later it will stimulate the smoother flow of procurement-sensitive 
goods and services, making European transport more competitive in both the local market and 
the world market. This approach believes that public procurement policy can provide the basis 
for the success of a unified market, long-term, sustainable development, creating new jobs 
and providing value-for-money public services for the taxpayers and users.  
But these contradicting goals actually weaken the same competitiveness, the growth of 
which could for example assist to achieve the employment goals. 
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6. Conclusion 
Public procurement could stimulate not only the growth of the economy (Schwarz J.I. 
(2010) but its exact opposite as well, and if it is used too “creatively”, it can cause irreparable 
damages to the economy, to public procurement culture and the trust of contracting 
authorities. Morand was justified to say: “there are other different practical possibilities”24 on 
prioritizing SMEs via public procurement. But coming from an underdeveloped public 
procurement culture, examining the result of the same market within the EU is incomparable. 
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Loader K. (2005) systematizes the most important report, initiatives of the development of 
public sector purchasing in the UK. The experience, the opportunity for data-mining, the 
features of the traditional and modern approaches to purchasing in Great Britain show that the 
same model works in a completely different way in an another country and can be a catalyst 
to achieve best value for money  
The Hungarian ongoing centralization, the general standstill in public procurement, the 
widening scope of control is unlikely to increase efficiency, and will no doubt cause serious 
concerns for the contracting authorities and for SMEs as well. The time has come to forget 
about public procurement as a means, and we ought to start focusing on the efficiency of 
public procurement having the right data and sufficient information in order to create more 
competitive services and a unified market.  
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